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COLLECTIVE ACTION AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Property Rights, Collective Action, and Agroforestry
FRANK PLACE, KEIJIRO OTSUKA, AND SARA SCHERR
Agroforestry is about integrated agricultural systems inwhich trees play a prominent role.Agroforestry can
provide a variety of functions or benefits for farmers and
communities.The most easily identifiable are the tree products
consumed by humans: fuelwood, timber, poles, fruits, medicines,
and resins.A second group of benefits consists of the services
provided by trees to other agricultural activities of the farmer:
fodder, green manure, shade, soil conservation, and stakes.A
third group includes the communitywide or even global benefits
from agroforestry systems: biodiversity, watershed protection,
carbon sequestration, and microclimate regulation. In this brief,
we explore the role that social institutions—specifically
property rights and collective action—may play in the develop-
ment of agroforestry.
Different agroforestry systems require different periods of
time to develop and manage. Depending upon what benefits are
sought, farmers will adopt varying degrees of joint action or
coordination within the landscape. Over longer time periods,
property rights increase in importance; over larger areas, collec-
tive action becomes more important.The figure shows how
different types of agroforestry outputs or activities will demand
different levels of property rights or collective action.
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND AGROFORESTRY
To justify investing in trees, a household or group must have
reasonable assurance of receiving the benefits from their invest-
ments. Investors must have confidence that tenure will be secure
in the future. In much of the world, the rights to plant, harvest,
and benefit from trees are linked to underlying land rights. In
places where individuals or households have acquired land on a
permanent basis, through purchase or inheritance for example,
they almost always have rights to plant and harvest trees.
Complications arise when government regulations protect a
particular tree, when a tree is naturally growing and perhaps
predates a household’s occupation of the land, or when there
are overlapping rights (for example, between two families). In
these cases rights to the trees may be contested. In the mailo
tenure system in Uganda, both owners and long-term tenants
claim strong rights to land. Customary or formal legal rules may
grant certain tree rights to non-landowners.The poor may be
granted collection rights to fallen tree fruits or dead branches
for fuelwood, or pastoralists may be given access to tree fodder
in the dry season.
There are also situations where rights and incentives to
plant trees are weak.This is the case with land acquired on a
temporary basis, for example, through sharecropping arrange-
ments. Land rights may not be conducive to tree planting when
the state is the de jure owner of all land. In some cases rights to
land are conditional on certain behavior. In matrilocal societies
such as in southern Malawi, husbands’ rights to land are condi-
tional on their continued marriage to the wife, and in patrilocal
societies women do much of the agricultural work but lose their
rights if the marriage ends. In parts of Africa, women may lack
individual rights to plant trees that produce direct consumer
products, although they may be allowed to plant trees for other
purposes. Local custom or law often defines specific types of
rights, such as the rights of neighbors to harvest products from
farm boundary plantings or to plant trees that will block the
sunlight to a neighbor’s house.
The importance of tree tenure must also be considered at a
landscape level.Where farmers have unfettered access to trees
in woodlands or forests, their incentives to plant trees on their
own land are reduced, even if their rights to plant are unques-
tioned. By the same token, if farmers lose access rights to
communal land, such as when land is designated a restricted
conservation area, incentives to plant trees in household plots
might increase. In strong communal land tenure systems,
communities may be encouraged to establish agroforestry
systems that provide communal benefits, such as riverine vegeta-
tion or common dry season tree fodder reserves.
In customary tenure systems, individual rights to land are
granted to those who invest in the land. In the past the major
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investment required to open up new land consisted of clearing
trees, and so deforestation became associated with increased
individual tenure security.Today, with virgin land all but disap-
pearing, new types of investments are more commonly made to
secure tenure on customary lands.Tree planting happens to be
one of the easiest and most durable investments people can
make to prevent the emergence of claims to the land from
other family members, villagers, or authorities. In situations
where tree planting can enhance tenure security, it is not
necessarily the initial level of tenure security that determines
the extent of tree planting, but the expected tenure security at
the time the benefits accrue.As a result, one may well observe
significant tree planting in areas where tenure security is
perceived to be relatively low.This tendency also applies to the
state. Establishing plantations on customary land can be a way
for the state to reassert its rights over customary legal
systems.This larger goal of expanding control explains why
local communities in various parts of Southeast Asia have
burned or encroached on state-run eucalyptus plantations.
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND AGROFORESTRY 
Most agroforestry systems can be established on individual
plots and managed without explicit collective action. But
collective action can increase the effectiveness of agroforestry,
either by reducing risks or costs or by enabling positive exter-
nalities to occur. Examples include collecting and mixing tree
seeds to prevent genetic deterioration, managing group
nurseries to take advantage of scarce water sources, estab-
lishing grazing rules to prevent browsing of seedlings, and
collectively guarding valuable tree stands to reduce protection
costs.
For agroforestry systems intended to produce community-
wide agricultural or environmental benefits, other types of
collective action are essential for establishment and manage-
ment. Examples include the coordinated planting of trees to
reduce soil erosion in a watershed or to establish a communi-
tywide windbreak (such as was done to protect dairy calves
and coffee trees in Costa Rica) and the joint fencing of lands
to restore natural woody vegetation for biodiversity and water
management (as has been done by large farms in Australia).
These examples of collective action for agroforestry are seen
throughout the world.
Although nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or
external projects often attempt to create new local organiza-
tions to carry out such activities, mobilizing existing local
groups can be more effective over the long term. Even if the
work is new to these existing groups, they can be successful
because social capital (trust and mutual obligations) and orga-
nizational systems are already established.
RELEVANT LESSONS FOR AGROFORESTRY
As shown in the figure, the importance of property rights or
collective action arrangements for management incentives will
depend on the particular agroforestry-related task, product, or
service being evaluated. Consider the difference between
timber and nontimber forest products. In the case of a timber
plantation (lower right portion of the figure), incentives to
invest and manage determine the level of benefits received.
Since it is relatively simple to detect harvesting activities and
the size of timber area is often limited, it is easy to protect the
trees. In such a case, a clear private property rights system
leads to an efficient management outcome. In the case of
woodlands (upper left portion of the figure), the protection of
nontimber products is costly but tree management is not very
important because of relatively low returns to improved
management for these lower-value products. In this case,
collective protection under a common property regime system
often works best. Finally, effective property rights or collective
action arrangements need not be formalized. In many examples
throughout the world, indigenous systems provide appropriate
incentives for the development of agroforestry systems.
Social institutions for property rights and collective action
clearly shape agroforestry investments.Agroforestry develop-
ment initiatives must consider these institutions as they work
with local people to identify suitable tree species, agroforestry
systems, planting sites, and management systems. In the short
term, there may be limited scope to modify these institutions
but considerable room to work creatively within them. Over
the medium to long term, the development of property rights
and organizations for collective action will be critical to
improved land management, including agroforestry.
In the future, property rights and collective action will play
increasingly pivotal roles in defining rights and responsibilities
over the externalities of tree management practices.As stake-
holders recognize the need for effective management of, for
example, the erosion resulting from tree felling or rights to
carbon sequestration from tree planting, they will increasingly
value and depend on the institutions that protect their 
property rights. 
For further reading see R. Meinzen-Dick,A. Knox, F. Place,
and B. Swallow, eds., Innovation in Natural Resource
Management:The Role of Property Rights and Collective Action
in Developing Countries (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2002); K. Otsuka and F. Place, eds., Land Tenure and
Natural Resource Management:A Comparative Study of
Agrarian Communities in Asia and Africa (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2001).
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